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I.

THE ISSUE

This essay touches on a question that often generates deadlock: should the central
actors in the national and international economy—from private companies to the
World Trade Organization (WTO)1—consider it part of their mandate to respect
human rights? One of the reasons for the deadlock is that critics object to an attempt
to join into a unified set of principles what look like totally disparate domains:
commercial relations and concerns for social justice. It makes sense, they say, to
choose between these two but not to try to meld one with the other.
Nevertheless, attempts carry on. The marriage is sometimes attempted on
grounds of economic self-interest. This argument acknowledges that human rights
can often enhance the reputation of the body involved, be it a company operating in
a controversial part of the world or the WTO regularly coping with outrage from
some part of the public. The institution involved is encouraged to see the claims of
human rights as, on this view, good for business. This approach creates a hostage to
fortune. However, if, in any given situation, it is manifestly bad for business to have
the institution’s hands tied with human rights requirements, then the justification for
obeying the constraint drains away. If a company does not have to worry about its
reputation since it does not encounter customers in the general public, or if it has
made the rational calculation that the extra cost associated with complying with
human rights requirements outweighs the benefit of doing so, then there is nothing
further linking the institution to that standard. The grip of human rights then
becomes occasional and fragile. If the argument linking respect for human rights to
economic self-interest is a link that is too weak for the human rights advocate, it is a
link that is too much of an imposition in the eyes of those wary of human rights.
The occasional appearance of these entitlements, when and if they happen to work in
favor of business, is sometimes felt by financial planners to inject too much uncertainty
into their strategies.
Another way of trying to achieve the marriage between human rights and
commercial interests is via an analogy with the state—powerful economic actors are
stronger than most states, it is argued, and should therefore be held to the same
international human rights standards that states are asked to observe. This view also
often fails to convince the skeptic. States, on the one hand, and bodies such as
corporations or the WTO on the other, are said to be different in a fundamental
way: the state draws its legitimacy from its ability to protect the basic rights of its
subjects in society. If it did not, then there would be little reason to accept its
authority. The corporation and the trade regulating body, argues the skeptic, have
the roots of their legitimacy elsewhere. They have, for example, been created for
specific purposes: to build and operate petroleum pipelines, or to integrate and
expand markets for trade and investment. These specific commitments are thought
to narrow the mandate of such bodies: their core obligation, it is said, is to further
the particular business objectives for which they were founded, not to become
involved in the general, open-ended commitments of human rights that should
concern the state.
1.

The WTO is an organization to which most states belong, designed to supervise and liberalize
international trade. See generally World Trade Organization, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
whatis_e/wto_dg_stat_e.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2009).
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These disagreements bypass what is actually happening. The rules and policies
that are increasingly tying businesses and trade bodies to human rights occupy a
different terrain: the link is stronger than the first position suggests—companies are
increasingly held to human rights standards in bad times as well as good—but the
responsibility created falls short of that proposed by the analogy with the state. Even
though human rights are moving up the agenda for commercial actors, there persists
a gap between the responsibilities of the state and that of independent institutions
lying beneath or beyond it. Human rights stand in what can be called a “collateral”
relationship to the independent institution’s other objectives.
The term “collateral” aims to capture a particular feature that human rights
might acquire as they impinge on an organization’s functions. Consider an example:
a national government and a private corporation can each undertake the exploitation
of petroleum deposits, and they can each commit themselves to respecting human
rights while doing so. This can include rights to an adequate standard of protection
of health and safety that might be threatened in the course of operations. Now, there
are several ways of adjusting the organization’s activity so as to meet the human
rights demands. One way involves shaping the rules that govern the extraction of
the oil so as to do the least amount of damage to the rights; another way involves the
opposite—shaping those rules designed to protect the rights so as to do the least
amount of damage to the oil operations. Both approaches manifest a degree of
respect for human rights, but the former strategy places them at the center of the
organization’s priorities, while the latter allocates those rights to a collateral role. In
principle, the democratic state places its ability to deliver the rights in question at the
core of its obligations. For the non-state economic actor, however, this central
commitment is often considered inappropriate.2 Many involved in running businesses
or international trade regulating bodies tacitly favor the collateral role. They will
acknowledge responsibility for human rights and incorporate them into their codes
of conduct, but when tensions with their economic objectives appear, their
commitment to human rights becomes subordinate to their primary mandate. The
result is that basic rights are given a place on the institutional agenda, but it is not a
place that someone schooled in human rights principles might expect them to
occupy.3
2.

For examples of positions wanting to give human rights a central role in international trade, see U.N.
Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm’n on Prevention of Discrimination and Prot. of
Minorities, Working Paper: Human Rights as the Primary Objective of International Trade, Investment and
Finance Policy and Practice, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/11 (June 17, 1999) (prepared by J. OlokaOnyango & Deepika Udagama); The High Commissioner, U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC],
Sub-Comm’n on Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights, Liberalization of Trade in Services and Human
Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/9 (June 25, 2002).

3.

See Amnesty Int’l, Contracting out of Human Rights: The Chad-Cameroon Pipeline
Project (2005), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/POL34/012/2005.pdf; Amnesty
Int’l, Human Rights on the Line: The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline Project (2003), available
at http://www.amnestyusa.org/business/humanrightsontheline.pdf. For earlier treatments of these
issues by the author, see Sheldon Leader, Collateralism, in Global Governance and the Quest for
Justice 53 (Roger Brownsword ed., 2006) [hereinafter Leader, Collateralism]; Sheldon Leader, Trade
and Human Rights II, in 4 The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic, and Political
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II. TWO EXAMPLES

Consider two situations in which we can see an opening for human rights
concerns in the international economy, and where the entitlements occupy a collateral
role.
A. A WTO Case
In the Thai Cigarettes case, Thailand limited imports of tobacco while permitting
its domestic manufacture and sale.4 The limitation on imports was prima facie
contrary to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), one of the trade
treaties administered by the WTO.5 Thailand sought to defend the measures, inter
alia, as necessary for the protection of human health, which is one of the heads of
protection permitted by the GATT.6 It was concerned with keeping domestic
demand from growing.7 Thailand argued that the entry of foreign producers would
bring with it targeted marketing that would increase consumption among parts of
the population who smoked far less than their foreign counterparts.8 Smoking, it
argued, “lowered the standard of living, increased sickness and thereby led to billions
of dollars being spent every year on medical costs, which reduced real income and
prevented an efficient use being made of resources, human and natural.”9 The WTO
dispute settlement panel did not disagree with Thailand’s right to protect public
health, but found that it could do so by a less trade-restrictive method: regulations
requiring that the potentially harmful ingredients in different sorts of cigarettes,
domestic or foreign, be clearly indicated to the consumer.10 Thailand’s methods of
limiting tobacco use were therefore deemed unnecessary for the protection of public
health.11
Two things about this case deserve notice. First, Thailand was allowed to give
what can be called ultimate priority to the defense of public health—a domain in
Analysis 664 (Patrick F.J. Macrory et al. eds., 2005); Sheldon Leader, Human Rights, Risks, and New
Strategies for Global Investments, 9 J. Int’l Econ. L. 657 (2006) [hereinafter Leader, Human Rights];
Sheldon Leader, Two Ways of Linking Economic Activity to Human Rights, 57 Int’l Soc. Sci. J. 541
(2005).
4.

Report of the Panel, Thailand—Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, ¶ 1,
DS10/R (Nov. 7, 1990), GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 200 (1991) [hereinafter Thailand Report].

5.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XI, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GATT]. There were other heads of complaint as well, but these are not relevant in this
context.

6.

Id. art. XX(b); see also Thailand Report, supra note 4, ¶ 21 (articulating Thailand’s contention that “the
prohibition on imports of cigarettes was justified by the objective of healthy policy . . . [and] was
therefore covered by Article XX(b)”).

7.

See Thailand Report, supra note 4, ¶¶ 24–26.

8.

See id. ¶¶ 27, 54.

9.

Id. ¶ 21.

10. See id. ¶¶ 76–79.
11.

Id. ¶¶ 75, 81.
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which human rights figure.12 That is, it was entitled by the GATT to rank the
protection of public health above the imperative of opening its markets to foreign
imports, if a choice between the two had to be made. Second, the trading system
protected by the GATT contains a device for reducing the occasions on which such
a stark decision to opt for an ultimate priority is made: this is a requirement of
adjustment. Here the range of alternative ways of protecting public health is
scrutinized, and the one which does the least damage to a producer’s access to a
market is the one that is justified. The state’s mandate to respect and protect public
health remains, but its mode of execution is adjusted so as to allow space for the trade
treaty’s cross-cutting objective of opening markets on a non-discriminatory basis.
It is in this process of adjustment that basic rights can slip into a collateral
position. Standard human rights principles would require that any given piece of
commercial policy be adjusted so as to have the smallest impact on the right in
question.13 The GATT’s approach inverts this direction of adjustment: the methods
used by a member state to protect public health have to be adjusted so as to do the
least damage to the aim of opening markets.14
B. An Example of Corporate Activity
In the course of building and operating the petroleum pipeline for the export of
oil from Chad through Cameroon, ExxonMobil issued the following statement:
“[We are] steadfast in promoting respect for human rights throughout the world.
We believe corporations play an important role in supporting human rights and that
our presence in developing countries positively inf luences issues relating to the
treatment of people.”15
The construction of the pipeline raised a problem for the rights of local populations
with regard to their health. As heavy vehicles servicing the construction site passed
through populated areas, they generated large amounts of dust that posed a significant

12. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 12(1), Jan. 3, 1976, 993

U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR] (“The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.”); U.N.
Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, General Comment No.
14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000)
[hereinafter General Comment No. 14]. On the connection between the right to health and international
trade, see U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Human Rights, The Right of Everyone
to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/2004/49/Add.1 (Mar. 1, 2004) (prepared by Special Rapporteur, Paul Hunt).
13. The European Convention on Human Rights, for example, sets out certain rights that it then permits a

member state to override if, inter alia, it can show that doing so is for a valid cross-cutting objective and
does no more damage to the right than is “necessary in a democratic society.” See, e.g., Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, arts. 8–11, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5,
213 U.N.T.S. 222.
14.

For elaboration of this point, see Leader, Collateralism, supra note 3.

15.

ExxonMobil, 2003 Corporate Citizenship Report Summary, available at http://www.exxonmobil.
com/corporate/files/corporate/CCR_2003.pdf.
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health hazard, particularly to the elderly and the young.16 There are two ways to
deal with such a problem. One is for the company to require its vehicles to slow
down on the dirt roads in the relevant areas. The other is to pave the roads with the
appropriate dust controlling substance. The first would reduce the health hazard to
some degree, but not as much as the second. On the other hand, the second would
involve greater expense, adding an obstacle to the commercial objectives of the
project.
Which of these solutions is in keeping with the spirit of ExxonMobil’s human
rights undertaking? This question would be triggered if the state were to impose the
paving requirement, since ExxonMobil might then resist on the ground that its
investment contract with the state provides that no “unreasonable” regulation of its
operations can be imposed.17 This term stands alongside the requirement in the
contract that domestic law applicable to the project will be interpreted so as not to
“prejudice the . . . economic advantages” of the investor.18 Therefore, the contract
could be read so as to allow the company to allocate the health concerns of the local
population to a clear, but collateral role. The company could claim that it fulfills its
explicit commitment to health rights by slowing the speed of its vehicles. At the
same time, by refusing the more costly paving option, it adopts the solution that has
the least significant impact on the project’s core commercial objectives. The
independent monitor for the project indicates that ExxonMobil in effect has taken
this position and the monitor noted that well after the project’s beginning, “the
[petroleum] Consortium remain[ed] reluctant to apply a more permanent (and more
costly) coating on trafficked areas of the roads.”19 The dust continued to be generated
well above the level that paving would have prevented.
For those not satisfied with this way of adjusting basic rights and the imperatives
of economic organizations, what is the alternative?
III. MOVING FROM A COLLATERAL TO A CENTRAL ROLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

There is a good deal at stake here. Human rights are given a role, but the level at
which those rights are protected can be reduced by the principles of adjustment that
are at work. For the Chad/Cameroon pipeline consortium to devote a considerable
16. Korina Horta et al., Envtl. Def. Fund, The Chad-Cameroon Oil and Pipeline Project

(2007), available at http://www.edf.org/documents/6282_ChadCameroon-Non-Completion.pdf
(“Major dust problems continue to be observed in the oil field area, especially along the main road.
They are seriously impairing visibility and impacting air quality in the area. . . . [T]he situation poses
health risks to the communities, including respiratory distress, and it calls for an urgent assessment of
the impact of the damage caused by thick layers on crops, trees and shrubs.”).
17.

Agreement for the Development of Oil Fields, between the Republic of Chad and Esso-Shell-Chevron,
cl. 17.4 (2004) (on file with author).

18. Id. cl. 34.4.
19.

Envtl. Def. et al., The Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development & Pipeline Project:
Environmental and Social Problems Identified by the External Compliance Monitoring
Group, the International Advisory Group, and the Inspection Panel (2004), available at
http://www.bicusa.org/Legacy/Chad-Cam_ES_July2004.pdf.
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amount of its time, energy, and resources to paving an access road is, in the
collateralist’s view, to promote confusion—confounding the degree of commitment
we can rightly expect from a state with that which we should expect of certain bodies
that operate either below or beyond it. If the state wishes to pave such roads at
taxpayers’ expense, then—from this view—so be it. The corporation would have no
objection. Similarly, if Thailand were to wish to spend extra amounts of taxpayers’
money on providing cures for smoking related illnesses, then the WTO would not
stand in its way. What the WTO did object to was an attempt by the state to achieve
an extra margin of health protection via further inroads into market freedom, which
the WTO was in no position—from its perspective—to grant. There was a form of
regulation available to Thailand that also allowed the trade body to fulfill its core
mandate. Whatever solution might appeal to WTO officials in their personal
capacities, this was the one they felt themselves institutionally bound to favor.
Is it possible to move basic rights from a collateral into a central position for these
economic actors, and at the same time to preserve an appreciation that they are not
states? We need to avoid trying to jam round pegs into square holes, but at the same
time we need to investigate the prospect of a possible fit by doing some trimming of
both. In specific terms, we need to see if there is an alternative way of fixing
adjustments for basic rights: adjustments that will mirror more closely the promise of
human rights principles. This would mean that, in our examples, the means used to
attain commercial objectives would sometimes be adjusted so as to create less risk to
public health, rather than the means used to attain health objectives always being
adjusted so as to create the least risk to commercial interests.
To see how this might work, consider two types of public health risk that arise
from the economic activity we have been examining. One such risk might be of
damage that is life-threatening or permanently debilitating, such as lung disease
contracted from smoking cigarettes, or from breathing high levels of a particular sort
of dust generated in pipeline work. A second set of possible risks is less severe, such
as the triggering of a mild allergy. Assume that all of these health hazards are
nevertheless serious enough to merit regulation by the state and that the regulation
will add to the costs of doing business. The question is, what happens to the state’s
ability to regulate in these two sets of circumstances when the regulations are put
through the filter of the WTO rules or instruments such as the ExxonMobil
investment agreement?
There might be one answer for the situation in which there are serious health
risks, and a different one where the risks to health are less severe. For goods that
carry the risk of serious damage, as in the Thai Cigarettes case, 20 it could be argued
that the state should have the space to adopt policies relatively free of the worry that
it must minimize the policy’s impact on trade. It must give priority to the demand of
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),
that it “recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of physical and mental health,” which includes an entitlement to “the
20. See supra Part II.A.
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prevention, treatment and control of . . . occupational and other diseases.”21 It should
not only have the formal entitlement to pursue this objective, as we have seen it has
under the GATT, 22 but it should also be free to adjust its restrictions on those
imported goods so as to do most to reduce the risks that those goods carry. In short,
the state should be entitled, under the GATT, to ban the import if this is the most
effective weapon it has to reach the level of protection it must provide.23
If, however, the state aims to protect the public from risks that are not as serious
as those in the first category, then the GATT would legitimately narrow the
government’s options, demanding that any such measures, while legitimate, be
implemented in the least trade restrictive way. This could require, for example, that
user warnings be placed on the article, rather than creating an outright ban. A
similar point can be made in relation to an activity such as the building of the pipeline
and the health risks that it creates.24 If the road-dust damage described earlier is
confined to less serious illnesses, avoidance measures are still necessary and can be
imposed by the state. But the company may well be entitled to demand that from
among the alternative means of avoidance of these illnesses, the one be chosen that,
while adding to the cost of operation, will do least damage to its commercial
objectives. Any further measure of protection would have to come from the state’s
own resources. This approach could be buttressed by an interpretation of the
investment agreement’s restrictions on unreasonable regulation, seen earlier, which
could prohibit any imposition on the company of costs above those minimally
necessary, leaving costs of more effective prevention to be met by the state out of its
own funds—if the state wishes to pursue that further margin of prevention.
Things are quite different when the impacts of the company’s activities on health
are serious. If these impacts fall within the range of the state’s obligation to prevent
diseases under the ICESCR, then, as has been seen, the state has no alternative but
to opt for the most effective means at its disposal in order to achieve its objective.
Assuming, in the example of the pipeline, that the damage to local populations is
caused by the company owning and operating the project, the state might be justified
in demanding that the company bear the cost of implementing the most effective
way of lowering this risk to acceptable levels.
Interpretations of the investment contract can also create space for the satisfaction
of this higher level of corporate obligation. In deciding what counts as an unreasonable
impingement on the profitability of the project, it is possible for the adjudicator to
carve out a special domain corresponding to the core obligations of the state to
protect the health of its population. Here, the space for social protection widens.
21.

ICESCR, supra note 12, arts. 12(1)–(2). This assumes, of course, that the state has ratified the
Covenant.

22.

GATT, supra note 5.

23.

This would be an approach to the GATT that fits it closely to the Covenant’s requirement on the state
“that every effort has . . . been made to use all available resources at its disposal in order to satisfy, as a
matter of priority, the obligations [under Article 12].” General Comment No. 14, supra note 12, ¶ 47.

24.

See supra Part II.B.
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The state should be entitled, under the contract, to choose the most effective methods
of damage prevention without the same concern of minimizing the impact on investor
returns. Such a measure could still be considered reasonable within the terms of the
agreement, so long as it was imposed by the state in good faith. The way would be
opened for the state to satisfy the right to the highest attainable level of health, as
demanded by the ICESCR.25
It is, of course, not easy to draw lines distinguishing between degrees of harm
arising from exposure to different sorts of goods and services. However, the bodies
charged with the primary duty of identifying types of workplace harm, such as the
International Labour Organization, or certain dangerous consumer goods, such as
the World Health Organization, do provide guidelines that can be used by those
interpreting provisions of the GATT or of an investment agreement. 26 These
guidelines can aid in determining when a state should adjust to find a method of
protecting a right that has the least negative impact on trade or corporate profitability,
or should impose a method of doing business that has the least negative impact on
the right.
IV. CONCLUSION

It is important to move away from a blanket view in which concerns for social
justice can be accommodated by business only by a side entrance—as a collateral
requirement to its core objectives.27 Such an approach can sit like a lid on top of a
wide range of basic rights and aspirations. The result is something we are familiar
with: the complaint worldwide that the rules administered by the WTO and the
impact of investments by foreign companies weaken the ability of member states to
pursue policies that are vital to social health.
To move human rights into the center of the concerns of economic actors in civil
society does not force those actors to abandon commercial objectives over a wide
range of their daily activities, or over a wide range of social concerns that these
activities might raise. But there are core of human rights concerns that occasionally
appear, and do legitimately put pressure on profits. This is not a category without
boundaries. On the contrary, benchmarks for protection that human rights provide
25.

For an investigation of different possible interpretations of investment contracts, see Leader, Human
Rights, supra note 3, at 657–705.

26. The International Labour Organization has, as its objective, the improvement of conditions of labor by

implementing world wide standards of fair treatment. See generally International Labour Organization,
Internationa l
Labour
Standards,
h t t p : // w w w. i l o . o r g /g l o b a l / W h a t _ w e _ d o /
InternationalLabourStandards/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2009). The World Health
Organization aims to improve health standards worldwide via assistance to governments and the
proposal of international conventions and agreements. See generally World Health Organization, About
WHO, http://www.who.int/about/en/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2009).
27.

There are principles established in some WTO cases that take us in this direction, acknowledging the
right of a state to restrict imports in order to meet its international obligations and allowing the level at
which that commitment is to be fixed to flow from that undertaking rather than be compromised by the
least trade restrictive demand. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures
Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DSB/M/103 (Apr. 5, 2001).
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are increasingly clear in indicating what interests they do and do not cover—as can
be seen in the human rights impact assessment tools that are being developed for
deployment by businesses and the bodies that regulate them.28
This proposal hopefully avoids the confusion of roles between state and non-state
actors that, as was seen from the outset, critics sometimes suspect lies in wait for
anyone wanting to link more tightly human rights and commercial concerns. The
state continues to have a wider range of responsibilities for a variety of basic rights
that are not shared by the more narrowly focused trade regulators or private
companies. Despite moving the standards of human rights into central concerns for
the latter, those institutions still remain what they are: bodies whose functions are
specified as the integration of markets for goods and services, the extraction of
petroleum at a profit, etc. But it is possible and desirable that these bodies sometimes
subordinate their defining functions to the wider demands of civil society, both
national and international. These demands should not be relegated to a collateral
role.

28. See Human Rights Impact, Assessment in Practice, Conference Report (2001), available at

ht t p://w w w.human r ightsimpact.org/f i leadmin / h r ia _ resou rces/Conference _ 2 0 07/ HR I A _
Conference_2007_Report_-Aim_for_human_rights.pdf.
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